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Abstract
This paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of ethanol produc-
tion on land use, deforestation and food production. A partial equilibrium
model of a national economy with two sectors and two regions, one of which
includes a residual forest, is developed. It analyses how an exogenous in-
crease in the ethanol price a¤ects input allocation (land and labor) between
sectors (energy crop and food). Three potential e¤ects are identied. First,
the standard and well-documented e¤ect of direct land competition between
rival uses increases deforestation and decreases food production. Second, an
indirect displacement of food production across regions, provoked by a shift
in the price of food, increases deforestation and reduces the total output of
the food sector. Finally, labor mobility between sectors and regions tends
to decrease food production but also deforestation. The overall impact of
ethanol production on forest conversion is ambiguous, providing a number
of interesting pointers to further, empirical research.
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1 Introduction
After initially being hailed as a promising climate change mitigation strategy
(Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Farrell et al., 2006), biofuels have since been im-
plicated in driving up food prices and causing deforestation (e.g. Righelato and
Spracklen, 2007; Fargione et al., 2008; Laurance, 2008; Scharlemann and Laurance,
2008; Tilman et al., 2009). Despite fears about these possible negative e¤ects, ex-
pansion of biofuel production continues apace (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007).
Biofuel production is currently dominated by ethanol, most of which is pro-
duced by the US (corn or maize ethanol) and Brazil (sugarcane ethanol) (IEA,
2007).1 Global ethanol production is predicted to rise from around 60 billion liters
in 2008, to 150 billion liters by 2018 (OECD-FAO, 2009). Producerse¤orts to in-
crease their supply capacity are based on expectations of future increased demand,
provoked by higher fossil fuel prices, growing mandates for blending biofuels in fos-
sil fuels used for transportation,2 and the recent commercialization of Flex-Fuel
Vehicles.3 Yet, with carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation accounting for up to one fth of global emissions of carbon dioxide (van der
Werf et al., 2009), it is clear that evidence for ethanol production in causing for-
est conversion would considerably decrease its attractiveness as a climate change
mitigation strategy. But at the current time, the available evidence, e.g. using
life-cycle analysis, is not clear-cut and subject to ongoing research and analysis.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the current debate on the pos-
sible social and environmental e¤ects of ethanol production by investigating the
impacts of production on land use, deforestation and food production. A par-
tial equilibrium model is developed to map out and hence, better understand the
channels through which ethanol production inuences the allocation of land and
a mobile input, labor, for agricultural production.
One well-understood channel is the land market. Land is a limited resource
allocated among di¤erent rival uses including forests. In competitive equilibrium,
this allocation is such that the marginal net benets of each use equate. If, for any
reason, one of these uses becomes relatively more protable, it will be allocated
more land, at the expense of the other uses in the same region. At the forest
frontier, this direct land competition may entail deforestation (e.g. Angelsen,
1999, 2007; Barbier, 2001).
Energy crops for ethanol production can directly compete with forests for land
(Chakravorty et al., 2008). This would then increase incentives to clear land for
1First generation biofuels are divided into ethanol and biodiesel. Other producers of ethanol
include Argentina, South Africa and India.
2Countries with such mandates include Brazil, Canada, India, China and the United States,
among others.
3Flex-Fuel Vehicles are able to run with any blending of gasoline and ethanol.
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energy crops. Although this argument applies when energy crops used for ethanol
production are grown in forest frontier regions, it is far from obvious that it would
still apply if energy crops are grown in regions where forest is not present. This
argument is being used in Brazil, for instance, where ethanol producers claim that
sugarcane expansion has no e¤ect on deforestation in Amazonia since production
occurs at large distance from the forest, e.g. in regions such as the state of Sao
Paulo in the south (see Goldemberg and Guardabassi, 2009).
So-called indirect" impacts of ethanol production have recently been dis-
cussed in the literature. The indirectness of these e¤ects is based on the idea
that they are manifested even when energy crops and forests grow in di¤erent
regions. Searchinger et al. (2008) utilise a partial equilibrium computable model
of agricultural markets to quantify the increased demand for land arising from US
corn ethanol targets. This study shows the possibility of forests being converted to
replace cropland diverted to corn production. It concludes that US corn ethanol
has a negative net e¤ect in terms of greenhouse gas savings compared to fossil fuels
when emissions from indirect land-use changes are taken into account. Although
some drawbacks to the methodology used have been identied (see Gallagher,
2008), this study is nevertheless the rst to take into account the possible indirect
e¤ects of ethanol production. However, the market mechanisms underlying this
e¤ect remain unclear. In this paper, we formally investigate these indirect e¤ects
in order to clarify the conditions under which they might occur. A two-regions
model is developed in which we explicitly consider the case where energy crops
and forest grow in di¤erent regions.
Additional to deforestation, biofuel production has also been implicated in
having a negative impact on food production, again through land competition
(e.g. Hubert and Moreaux, 2007). The allocation of land away from food to the
production of biofuels will, however, depend on various factors, some of which
exhibit a substantial degree of uncertainty, e.g. newer generation biofuels may
use land more e¢ ciently than current biofuel technologies (see Chakravorty et al.
(2009) for a complete review of the fuel-food debate). Although we focus primarily
on how ethanol production might impact on land use and forest conversion, our
framework for analysis also allows us to consider how it may a¤ect output of the
food sector.
In this paper, we develop a two-sector-two-input partial equilibrium model of a
national economy, where two nal goods an energy crop4 and a composite good
representing all other agricultural commodities (termed food") are produced in
two di¤erent regions. The two primary inputs considered are land and a mobile
4Some energy crops can also be used to produce food or other by-products than ethanol (e.g.
sugarcane, which is also used to produce sugar, maize). For simplicity, we assume here that all
energy crop produced is devoted to ethanol production. Also, by considering no processing costs,
we assume the output price of the energy crop to be just equal to the ethanol price.
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input (e.g. labor). Land type, i.e. land productivity, varies across the two regions,
one of which includes a residual forest. Property rights over the forest are consid-
ered ill-dened. Ill-dened property rights are a common feature of developing and
emerging economies (see Feder and Feeney, 1991) which are, with the exception of
the US, the main current and likely future ethanol producers. Examples of such
countries include Brazil, Colombia and India, among others.
Our results show that ethanol production can impact deforestation and food
production in three distinct ways. Two of these, namely the indirect e¤ects via
the land and labour markets, are formalised for the rst time. Taken together
and in contrast to previous research in this area, our framework o¤ers a more
complete, integrated picture of how biofuel production might inuence land use,
deforestation and food production.
First, there is the standard, direct-land-competition e¤ect by which forest con-
version is increased while food production declines. Second, we characterize an
indirect-displacement e¤ect whereby an increase in ethanol prices reduces inputs
available for food production thus entailing a lower output. This lower output
may a¤ect food prices and trigger a displacement of food production towards the
forest frontier. Consequently, deforestation increases while total food production
decreases. Finally, a third indirect e¤ect emerges which relates to the sectors
competition for labor and to this factors mobility. This labor mobility e¤ect de-
creases food production but also deforestation by drawing potential migrants into
the employ of the energy crop sector located in the non-forest region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The three e¤ects are characterized in section 3. Finally, section 4 discusses
the results and concludes.
2 The model
We consider a partial equilibrium setting with two inputs, land and labor, being
used to produce two di¤erent agricultural goods food and an energy crop. There
are two regions in this model di¤erentiated by their land quality. Region 1 has
land of better quality, e.g. for agricultural production, than region 2. Forest is
present in region 2 but not 1.5 The objective is to investigate how private agents
allocate inputs to the two sectors depending on output prices and how these
decisions impact on land use, forest conversion and food production.
In the following sub-sections, we describe the assumptions regarding the tech-
nology and the institutions embodied in the model.
5Forest land is generally not very productive for agriculture (Chomitz and Thomas, 2003).
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2.1 Technology
Let XA and XB be the quantities of food and energy crop produced, respectively.
2.1.1 The land factor
The amount of land available in region 1 (R1) is xed and is used by both sectors,
such that
(A.1.1 ) R1 = R1A +R1B, where R1i; i 2 fA;Bg corresponds to the amount of
land in region 1 used to produce Xi.
In region 2, besides the initial stock of land (R2), agents can obtain additional
land through forest conversion. Let RD2 denote the total land cleared by the two
sectors, and R2i; i 2 fA;Bg the amount of initial land in region 2 used to produce
Xi. We denote by RD2i; i 2 fA;Bg ; the quantity of deforested land used by each
sector. Then the total amount of land used for agriculture in region 2 is6
(A.1.2) R2 = R2 +RD2 with R2 = R2A +R2B and R
D
2 = R
D
2A +R
D
2B.
Producers face a cost depending on the amount of forest land they decide to
clear. This deforestation cost is given by cRD2i; i 2 fA;Bg ; c > 0, where c denotes
the unit cost" of forest conversion, i.e., the cost of allocating time and resources
to deforest one unit of land and prepare it for agriculture.
2.1.2 The labor factor
For simplication, we assume the total supply of labor to be inelastic. The econ-
omys total labor endowment is denoted L. We consider that labor can be either
immobile (A.2 ) or mobile (A.2 ), such that if L1i; i 2 fA;Bg are the quantities of
labor used by each sector in region 1 and L2i; i 2 fA;Bg ; the equivalent for region
2, then the constraint over this input can be written as
(A.2 ): L = L1 + L2 with L1 = L1A + L1B and L2 = L2A + L2B, where the upper
bar designs xed quantities;
or
(A.2 ): L = L1 + L2 = L1A + L1B + L2A + L2B, where only the total amount of
labor available for the two sectors is xed.
6Note that the maximum possible quantity of R2 will be attained when all forest is converted
into agricultural land. At that point, no more deforestation is possible and the stock of land of
quality 2 becomes xed. For simplicity, we abstract from such a corner solution.
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2.1.3 The nal good production
Xi; i 2 fA;Bg ; can be produced in both regions or just in one of them. The
latter case represents the possibility that some crops can only be produced using
particular types or qualities of land. This can be seen, for example, in the case of
Brazil where sugarcane is mostly produced in the centre-south part of the country
where the soil and climate suit sugarcane better than that found in the north
(Goldember, 2008). Similarly, sugarcane production is concentrated in certain
regions of India such as the state of Kerala where conditions are subtropical and
relatively wet compared with the north of the country. In order to take this
possibility into account,7 the production function of sector i 2 fA;Bg is given by
(A.3 ): Xi = (R1i)(L1i) + i

R2i +R
D
2i

(L2i)
 ,
where 0  i < 1 is a parameter representing the factorsproductivity di¤erence
between regions 1 and 2.
The special case where the energy crop cannot be produced in region 2, due
to agro-ecological constraints, can be represented here by B = 0. In both cases
+  < 1.
2.2 Institutions
Sectors A and B are competitive and agents are price-takers regarding both output
and input prices. We denote by PA and PB the world price of food and the
energy crop, respectively.8 While PB is always exogenously given in the model, we
investigate, in case 2 below, the implications of relaxing our assumption concerning
PA, i.e. having PA a¤ected by the quantity XA produced in the national economy.
Specically, in this case we assume PA = (XA)
 
1
A (A.4 ), where A represents the
price elasticity of demand for good A in the world market. In the other cases , 1
and 3, PA is assumed exogenous (A.4 ).
Also, let P1 and P2 be the national land-rental prices. Wages are given by
W1 and W2. In the case where labor is perfectly mobile (A.2 ), the wage will be
the same in both regions such that W1 = W2 = W . Note that wages vary across
regions but not across sectors. This is due to the assumption that mobility within
a given region is always possible. Input prices are always determined endogenously
in the model.
7We note that other crops such as corn and switchgrass may be more adaptable to di¤erent
conditions than sugarcane.
8Since we assume that all the energy crop is devoted to ethanol production, PB also repre-
sents the ethanol price. In the following, we will use the terms "ethanol" and "energy crop"
interchangeably.
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3 The decentralized equilibrium
In this section we derive factor demands, quantities produced and the amount of
deforestation in equilibrium.
The prot of sector i 2 fA;Bg is given by
i = PiXi  W1L1i  W2L2i   P1R1i   P2R2i   cRD2i.
Applying (A.3 ), prots can be rewritten as
i = Pi

(R1i)
(L1i)
 + i

R2i +R
D
2i

(L2i)

	
 W1L1  W2L2   P1R1i   P2R2i   cRD2i.
After rearrangement, the rst-order conditions for an interior solution write
R1i =

P1
Pi
 1
  1
(L1i)

1   , (1)
L1i =

W1
Pi
 1
   1
(R1i)

1   , (2)
R2i +R
D
2i =

P2
Pii
 1
  1
(L2i)

1   , (3)
L2i =

W2
Pii
 1
   1  
R2i +R
D
2i
 
1   , (4)
and
R2i +R
D
2i =

c
Pii
 1
  1
(L2i)

1   . (5)
Note that from (3) and (5) an interior solution requires P2 = c at equilibrium.
This means that the cost of deforestation, given by c, must be equal to the market
rental price of land in region 2. Otherwise, there are two possible corner solutions:
either P2 < c and then no deforestation occurs or, on the contrary P2 > c, and
producers would not use the stock of land of type 2 already available (R2) and
would prefer to clear forest. This paper will only consider interior solutions.9
In the subsections below, we present three di¤erent cases of equilibrium, in
order to explore both direct and indirect e¤ects of ethanol production. First, we
9This condition does not rule out the case where all land of type 2 initially available (R2) has
already been put under production with new land only obtainable through forest conversion.
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present the case where the energy crop is grown in the two regions. This implies
that in region 2 there will be direct land competition between the three possible
land uses. In the two following cases, we restrict the production of the energy crop
to region 1, such that all e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the ethanol price on
activities in region 2 will be considered as being indirect. These indirect e¤ects
operate through the labor and land markets.
3.1 Case 1: The Direct Land Competition E¤ect
To illustrate the direct e¤ect of ethanol production on deforestation, we assume
a xed stock of labor in each region (A.2 ). By excluding labor mobility we want
to highlight the impact of using land to produce ethanol both on food production
and deforestation. Moreover, we assume that both sectors A and B use land in
the two regions (A.3 ). Finally, we consider the price of food PA to be exogenously
given (A.4 ).
3.1.1 The input demand functions
In this case, the input demand functions are obtained by using (1) and (2), sub-
stituting one into the other and rearranging to get
R1i =

Pi
P1
1  


Pi
W1

 (6)
and
L1i =

Pi
W1
1  


Pi
P1

 . (7)
where  = 1     > 0.10
In the same way, using (3) and (4), we get
R2i +R
D
2i =

Pii
P2
1  


Pii
W2

 (8)
and
L2i =

Pii
W2
1  


Pii
P2

 . (9)
10 > 0 follows from our assumption of decreasing returns to scale.
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These equations express the quantity of inputs the two sectors demand in
order to produce a certain quantity Xi, given output price Pi. Also, using (8),
R2 = R2A +R2B and RD2 = R
D
2A +R
D
2B total forest conversion can be written as
RD2 =


P2
1  



W2


24(PAA)1 + (PBB)1
35 R2. (10)
3.1.2 The equilibrium land and labor allocations
Replacing the demand functions derived above in the constraints R1A+R1B = R1,
L1A+L1B = L1, and L2A+L2B = L2 one can compute the equilibrium factor prices
P e1 = 
24(PA)1 + (PB)1
35  1
R1
1   
L1

,W e1 = 
24(PA)1 + (PB)1
35  1
L1
1   
R1

and W e2 = 

c
 
1  
2664(PA)
1
 + (PB)
1

L2
3775

1  
, where e refers to equilibrium.
11 Using these prices and replacing them into the factorsdemand functions we
obtain the equilibrium input allocations
(R1i)
e =
R1
1 +

Pj
Pi
1

, (11)
(L1i)
e =
L1
1 +

Pj
Pi
1

, (12)
 
R2i +R
D
2i
e
=

c
 1
1  
2664 L2
(Pii)
1
 + (Pjj)
1

3775

1  
(Pii)
1
 , (13)
11Since weve assumed P2 = c, we do not have to compute the equilibrium price for land of
type 2.
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and
(L2i)
e =
L2
1 +

Pjj
Pii
1

, (14)
where i; j 2 fA;Bg ; i 6= j.
These equations represent the equilibrium quantities exchanged in the input
markets. From equations (11) and (13) we note that the equilibrium amounts of
land used by one sector decrease in the output price of the other sectors nal good.
For instance, if the price PB of ethanol increases, ceteris paribus, the amount of
land used by sector A in both regions decreases. This is because the energy crop
becomes more protable to produce and sector B consequently demands more
land. There will then be a shift of land in favor of the energy crop sector, up
to the point where the marginal rents of the two sectors equalize again. This
mechanism also holds for the labor factor.
The equilibrium amount of forest conversion is given by
 
RD2
e
=

c
 1
1    L2 1  
24(PAA)1 + (PBB)1
35

1  
 R2. (15)
3.1.3 The Direct Land Competition E¤ect
Proposition 1 Without labor mobility, and when the food price PA is given, de-
forestation is increasing in world ethanol price PB; as long as B > 0.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to PB yields
@(RD2 )
e
@PB
=

1
1  

c
 1
1   (B)
1
 (PB)
+ 

2664 L2
(PA)
1
 + (PB)
1

3775

1  
which is positive, as long as B > 0 .
We term this the Direct Land Competition e¤ect. Ethanol production implies
setting land aside to grow energy crops. This additional land use increases land
competition and pressure on forests. We consider this e¤ect to be direct because
the impact on forest conversion is only observable if the energy crop is grown at
the forest frontier (B > 0). In the case where B = 0, the equilibrium amount
of deforestation given by equation (15) would be independent of the ethanol price
PB.
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This result is standard and in line with theory explaining land-use changes
by variations in marginal rents of competing land uses (e.g. Angelsen, 1999).
This e¤ect has been observed in Brazil, for example, where ethanol producers
have been found responsible for illegally clearing the countrys rapidly-shrinking
Atlantic forest.12
Proposition 2 Without labor mobility, and when the food price PA is given, food
production is decreasing in ethanol price PB.
Proof. Proof of this proposition is obtained by analyzing equations (11) and (13),
where the amount of land allocated to one use is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the
other goods price.
This second result establishes the rationale for fuel-food competition and is also
in line with the previous literature on land competition among rival uses (ibid).
3.2 Case 2: The Displacement E¤ect
Similar to the Direct Land Competition e¤ect, the displacement e¤ect material-
izes through the land market. To isolate this e¤ect we maintain the assumption
regarding labor immobility (A.2 ). Also, we set B = 0 such that energy crop
production is restricted to region 1, to abstract from the Direct Land Competi-
tion e¤ect. Finally, although agents remain price takers, we now consider that the
quantity XA produced in the country a¤ects the world price PA (A.4 ). This cor-
responds to cases where the countrys production represents a signicant part of
the world total production or where the goods investigated are only traded within
the national economy, so that PA is a national price. The equilibrium amount of
inputs used by the two sectors in region 1 are the same as presented in the section
above, i.e. they are given by equations (11) and (12). Since sector B is restricted
to region 1, it does not employ any labor in region 2. The equilibrium amount of
labor for sector A in region 2 is given by L2A = L2. Similar reasoning applies for
land of type 2, such that R2A = R2.
The equilibrium amount of good A produced is given by
(XA)
e =
 
R1
  
L1
2641 + PB
PA
1

375
+
+ (A)
1
1  

PA
c
 
1    
L2
 
1   . (16)
12http://www.illegal-logging.info/item_single.php?it_id=2766&it=news
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Finally, the total amount of land conversion in this case is given by the following
expression:
RD2 = R
D
2A =

PAA
c
 1
1    
L2
 
1      R2 . (17)
3.2.1 The Displacement E¤ect
Proposition 3 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector PA
is endogenous, then an increase in the world ethanol price increases deforestation,
even if the energy crop and the forest grow in di¤erent regions.
Proof. When PA is a¤ected by quantity XA produced in the country, then given
(A.4 ):
XA = (PA)
 A , XA (PA)A = 1.
From (16), we see that XA is decreasing in PB. Now, consider an increase in
PB: Then, to restore the equality XA (PA)
A = 1, PA has to increase.
Finally, from equation (17), one can see that deforestation increases in PA.
Thus, an increase in PB induces an increase in PA, which increases forest conver-
sion.
More precisely, the e¤ect of PB on PA works through the land market in region
1. In fact, a higher PB implies that the amount of land in region 1 used by sector
B increases at the expense of sector A. Consequently, the total quantity of food
produced is lower, which increases its nal price.13 This increases the protability
of deforestation in region 2: We term this the displacement e¤ect, meaning that
increased marginal protability of ethanol may induce a displacement of other
agricultural activities towards the forest frontier.
It is important to highlight that this result holds if and only if the quantity
XA produced in the national economy is su¢ ciently high to a¤ect the world price
PA or if it is only traded within the national economy. The former case can be
seen, for example, in Brazil, which was responsible for approximately 25 percent
of global soya production, in 2008. Another example, India, the worlds second-
largest producer of sugarcane and with plans to rapidly expand ethanol production,
produced 22 percent of global rice output, in 2008.14 The latter is generally the
case for locally-produced staple food crops in many developing economies.
Proposition 4 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector
PA is endogenous, then an increase in world ethanol price PB decreases the total
13The correlation between ethanol and food prices has been highlighted in the literature (see
Charkravorty et al., 2009).
14Crop data for both Brazil and India are available at www.faostat.fao.org
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quantity XA produced in the country.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (XA)
e in equation (16) with respect to PB gives
@(XA)
e
@ (PB)
=  

+ 

 
R1

(L1)

(PA)
1

2641 + PB
PA
1

375
1++
(PB)
+ 

which is negative.
Note that the decrease in the equilibrium quantity of food XA depends on
the variation of PA subsequent to an increase in PB, which depends on several
parameters including the price elasticity of food, A.
15
In this setting, the decrease in the amount of food produced due to the induced
increase in food price is dampened by the possibility of creating new agricultural
land through deforestation. As compared to the case where PA is exogenous,
consumers of food are therefore less a¤ected from the increase in ethanol demand,
although new food production will occur at the cost of the environment.
3.3 Case 3: The Labor Mobility E¤ect
Here we aim to better understand how ethanol production may a¤ect deforestation
and the food sector, but this time through the labor market. By introducing labor
mobility, we show that the quantity of labor used in activities in region 1 has an
inuence on the amount of labor available for activities in region 2 and hence,
on the amount of forest clearing. From (15), deforestation is positively correlated
with the amount of labor in region 2. In order to isolate this e¤ect, we again set
15This variation can be computed by solving for
dPA
dPB
, which can be accompolished by totally
di¤erentiating XA = (PA)
 A with respect to PA and PB and using equation (16) to replace for
the equilibrium value of XA. The sign of this expression is nevertheless ambiguous:
dPA
dPB
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
A
(PA)
1+A
+


1  

(A)
1
1  


c
 
1   L2A

1   (PA)
2  1
1  

R1
 
L1
  + 


(PB)
 + 

(PA)
1

26641 +
 
PB
PA
! 1

3775
1++
  PA
PB
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
 1.
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B = 0 such that sector B is only present in region 116 and consider PA to
be exogenous (A.4 ). Contrary to cases 1 and 2, we assume perfect labor mobility
(A.2 ). The wage in both regions will then be the same and is hence denoted W .
3.3.1 The ethanol sector maximization problem
Sector B now maximizes B = PBXB   WL1B   P1R1B, subject to XB =
(R1B)
(L1B)
. From the rst-order conditions of the problem, one can derive
the demand functions of land and labor for sector B, which are given by
R1B =

PB
P1
1  


PB
W

 (18)
and
L1B =

PB
W
1  


PB
P1

 (19)
3.3.2 The agriculture sector maximization problem
Sector A uses land of both regions for its production. It then solves for
max
(R1A;L1A;R2A;R
D
2A;L2A)
A = PAXA  W (L1A + L2A)  P1R1A   P2R2A   (c+ )RD2A
s:t: XA = (R1A)
(L1A)
 + A

R2A +R
D
2A

(L2A)
.
Using the rst-order conditions, the input demand functions of the sector are
given by
R1A =

PA
P1
1  


PA
W

 , (20)
L1A =

PA
W
1  


PA
P1

 , (21)
R2 +R
D
2 =

PAA
P2
1  


PAA
W

 , (22)
and
L2 =

PAA
W
1  


PAA
P2

 . (23)
16This implies, as in case 2 above, that R2A = R2, RD2A = R
D
2 and L2A = L2.
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3.3.3 The Labor Mobility E¤ect
In order to demonstrate the Labor Mobility e¤ect, we proceed in two steps. First,
we show that the wage level increases with the ethanol price. Then, we show
how deforestation varies with the wage level. This represents an indirect e¤ect of
ethanol price on deforestation. This e¤ect is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 With labor mobility, when the food price PA is given, and when
ethanol is produced in a region di¤erent from the forest frontier, deforestation in
the forest region is decreasing in the ethanol price.
Proof. Using equations (18), (20) and the constraint R1 = R1A+R1B, we obtain
an equation giving the price of land in region 1, P1, as a function of the wage W
P1 = 


W
 
1  
2664(PA)
1
 + (PB)
1

R1
3775

1  
. (24)
Using the constraint L = L1A + L1B + L2A and equations (19), (21), (23) and
(24) we obtain the following expression:
L =


W
 1
1  
24(PA)1 + (PB)1
35

1    
R1
 
1   (25)
+


W
1  



P2


(APA)
1
 .
From equation (25) we can see that, ceteris paribus, if PB increases, then W
must increase as well since P1 and P2 are given. Now, looking at equation (22)
note that the amount of cleared land decreases with wage. Thus, an increase in
ethanol price provokes an increase in wage because the sector demands more labor.
This in turn decreases deforestation.
Our results show that a higher demand for labor in the ethanol sector attracts
workers to region 1. This reduces labor supply in region 2 thus lowering the
potential for deforestation in the region. We term this the Labor Mobility e¤ect.
The idea that the reallocation of labour might indirectly drive forest conversion
has not previously been considered in the literature. In principle, it could represent
an argument for developing or expanding ethanol production in regions far from
the forest frontier. Indeed, the energy crop sector has often been promoted as a
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potential source of employment for the rural poor (von Braun and Pachauri, 2006;
Ewing and Msangi, 2009). Our framework indicates, furthermore, that increasing
biofuel production may have the potential to lower the incentives for migration
towards forest regions hence reducing pressure on forests.
Proposition 6 With labor mobility, when the food price PA is given, the quantity
XA of good A produced in the country is decreasing in the ethanol price PB.
Proof. Using equations (18) to (24) and replacing these in the production function
yields:
XA =
 
R1
 
1   (PA)




W
 
1  
2641 + PB
PA
1

375
 24(PA)1 + (PB)1
35
+ 
1  
+


W




P2


(PA)
+ 
 .
From the expression above, the quantity XA of good A produced is, ceteris
paribus, decreasing in the wage W . We have already seen that the wage is in-
creasing in the ethanol price PB (see Proof of Proposition 5 above). Thus, XA is
decreasing in PB.
It is important to highlight that in this case, one can also observe the Direct
Land Competition e¤ect. In fact, additional to the increase in wage, a higher
ethanol price PB further decreases XA by reducing the equilibrium amount of
land allocated to sector A in region 1. Using equations (20) and (24) one can see
that the equilibrium amount of land allocated to sector A in region 1 is given by
(R1A)
e =
R1
1 +

PB
PA
1

, which is decreasing in PB. As a consequence, an increase
in ethanol price has a combined e¤ect through both the land and the labor markets,
provoking a decrease in the production of food.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of energy crop production
on land use, deforestation, and food production, through a partial equilibrium
model of input allocation between the energy crop and food sectors. The model
incorporates two regions of which only one contains forest. New land can be
16
allocated to crop production via forest conversion. Three distinct e¤ects are high-
lighted and analyzed separately. In this section, we discuss the conditions under
which each of the three e¤ects materializes. Table 1 summarizes the results.
E¤ects Assumptions Deforestation Food Production
Direct Land Competition PA Exogenous (A:4)
B > 0 (A:3)  
No labor mobility (A:2)
Displacement PA Endogenous (A:4)
B = 0 (A:3)  
No labor mobility (A:2)
Labor Mobility PA Exogenous (A:4)
B = 0 (A:3) + 
Labor mobility (A:2)
Table 1: Summary of conditions under which each e¤ect occurs
Note: "" denotes potentially increasing deforestation; "+" denotes potentially
reducing deforestation
The Direct Land Competition e¤ect (Case 1) is the one that has been most
investigated in the literature (e.g. Angelsen, 1999). Given a nite stock of land, the
allocation of land to one particular use can only be undertaken at the expense of
other uses. If the relative marginal protability of the energy crop sector increases,
e.g. due to an increase in the ethanol price, a reallocation of land previously under
rival land uses (food production and forest) in favor of the energy crop sector
occurs.
The possible existence of a Displacement e¤ect (Case 2) has also been discussed
but not formally derived in the literature, through the notion of indirect land
use changes (e.g. Gallagher, 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008). It expresses the
fact that the increased protability of one agricultural sector can displace other
agricultural activities towards marginal lands such as those under forest. We show,
however, that there are two necessary conditions for this e¤ect to be observed.
First, the energy crop has to be produced, at least partially, in the non-forested
region, i.e. away from the forest frontier. Second, the displaced activity has to
be such that national production a¤ects the output price. If this condition is not
satised, then the price of the potentially displaced good will not vary, leaving
its protability unchanged. Instead of a displacement of production one instead
observes a simple direct reallocation of land between the two activities. It then
becomes a Direct Land Competition e¤ect with no e¤ect on deforestation.
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Regarding the size of the displacement, it depends, among other factors, on
how sensitive the food price is to a decrease in quantities produced, expressed
by the elasticity A. Note, however, that the negative impact on the quantity of
food produced is dampened by the possibility of new agricultural land emerging
through deforestation. Indeed, the increase in the food price makes deforestation
more protable thus giving incentives to food producers to clear more land, a
trend commonly observed in forest frontier regions (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999;
Barbier, 2001). Newly available land is converted to food production, which lowers
the food shortage induced by land conversion to energy crop production in the
non-forest region, subsequent to the increase in ethanol prices. This e¤ect implies
that governments and decision makers keen to promote ethanol production should
focus on developing policy instruments to ensure that the displacement of food
production is guided towards idle land. If such land can be converted to food
production at relatively low cost, e.g. by proving technical assistance or building
infrastructure such as roads to reduce costs to market, then this could potentially
mitigate food price increases while preventing deforestation.
The Labor Mobility e¤ect (Case 3) is the other novelty of the paper. Of course,
our model assumptions regarding labor perfect mobility or total immobility are
extreme cases used to illustrate this e¤ect. In reality, agentsmobility is always im-
perfect and does not depend solely on wages. Other factors of mobility include the
availability and quality of infrastructure, family ties and household composition,
among others (Mincer, 1978). Nevertheless, our results imply that in a context
where the forest frontier is a suitable destination for poor rural households, the en-
ergy crop sector, when located in a non-forest region may represent an alternative
migration choice. This will particularly be the case when the energy crop sector
is labor intensive and o¤ers higher wages compared to other agricultural sectors.
Conversely, a decrease in demand for labor for the energy crop sector, for example
due to mechanization, could become an additional factor incentivizing agents to
migrate towards the forest frontier. Finally, an increase in labor demand in the
energy crop sector diverts labor away from the food sector thus decreasing food
production. Moreover, if the food price is endogenous, we would expect to see
additional upward pressure on the food price.
Our results show that the overall impact of ethanol production on food pro-
duction is unambiguously negative: whether considering direct or indirect e¤ects,
increasing ethanol demand drives down food output. The overall impact of ethanol
production on forest conversion, on the other hand, is ambiguous. In particular,
when considering the indirect e¤ects, increasing ethanol demand can both increase
deforestation through the land market and reduce deforestation via the labour mar-
ket (where there is free movement of labour). Which e¤ect dominates is essentially
an empirical question. Further ambiguities result from remaining uncertainties re-
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garding a number of parameters including the price elasticity of the food sector,
the size of the displacement e¤ect, and the total land available for food and energy
crops. Thus, the relative importance of these parameters in determining overall
impact implies a need for empirical research, perhaps undertaken in a specic
context.
Finally, we acknowledge that our model is only relevant for contexts where
forest might be vulnerable to deforestation, with weak property rights to forest
land, and where energy crops can only be grown under certain conditions. Thus,
of the two current major producers of ethanol, Brazil and the United States, our
model is only directly applicable to the former and not the latter. Nevertheless,
our model also captures the cross-border indirect e¤ect of increasing demand for
US corn ethanol on deforestation in Brazil, as demonstrated by Searchinger et
al. (2008). More pertinently, there are a number of countries and regions of the
world where the ethanol sector is in the process of being developed on a large
scale. These include India and Colombia (see Lapola et al., 2009; Quintero et al.,
2008), which have stocks of natural forest vulnerable to deforestation and, along
with Brazil, would form interesting case studies for further research. Such studies
could then be used to derive more concrete policy implications to show under
what conditions ethanol production could be expanded while minimising negative
impacts on deforestation and food production.
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